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I.

Introduction
The common law of agency imposes duties that principal and agent owe to each other,

including an agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal. Although not mirror images, these duties
usually run parallel in duration because most of the time, a principal’s duties, like an agent’s, are
coterminous with the relationship. This Chapter explores situations in which temporal lines of
demarcation do less work. The absence of a fully formed relationship of agency does not mean
that the parties owe each other no duties of any sort. Likewise, a relationship’s end does not
obviate continuing obligations stemming from the now-concluded relationship. The character
and content of duties on the peripheral edges of relationships vary, as do the justifications for
imposing duties and whether they are derived from doctrines apart from agency law.
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Additionally, issues at the temporal edges of agency relationships vary in whether their
resolution yields to bright-line determinations or requires fact-specific and nuanced inquiries.
The ubiquity of agency relationships—spanning otherwise-disparate contexts, including
organizational settings—makes these issues matter.1
Among fiduciary relationships, agency is distinctive because both principal and agent
hold ongoing power to terminate the relationship at will, albeit in breach of contract. The
distinctive structure of agency—empowering both parties to act unilaterally to end their
relationship, often preceded by a process of reflection and planning—assures the presence of
issues about duties on the periphery of termination. This dimension of agency’s distinctive
structure has implications for broader accounts of fiduciary obligation, especially those grounded
in cognitive dimensions of an actor’s loyalty. Agency doctrine generally permits an employee or
other agent to plan to compete with the principal following termination; but empowered to end
the relationship at any time, an agent’s commitment to it may always appear contingent, at least
as seen in retrospect by a now-former principal. Of course, a principal who appreciates agency’s
implications may attempt to structure the relationship’s terms to protect its interests.
Additionally, agency doctrine, applicable to ongoing relationships between parties whose

1See

Great Minds v. Fedex Office & Print Servs., Inc., 886 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2018)

2018)(noting “mundane ubiquity” of agency relationships; licensor’s counsel failed to address
agency relationships linking licensees with non-employee copying service when terms of license,
which permitted reproduction and distribution for non-commercial purposes by licensee, did not
prohibit delegation whether to licensee’s employees or non-employee agents).
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perspectives and preferences may shift over time, accommodates interim bargaining to adjust a
relationship’s terms going forward, each party always empowered to exit. This is not the
structure that underlies what’s often assumed to be the prototype for a fiduciary relationship, a
donative trust.
The Chapter opens by sketching aspects of the formation and termination of common-law
agency relationships. Requiring no formality to create, agency relationships are also relatively
fragile, in contrast with legal relationships grounded in property interests, donative trusts,
limited-liability entities, or bilateral contract. Next, the Chapter identifies and examines the
distinct bases on which agents might owe duties to prospective principals, including the
possibility of a distinct status or category, “agent-in-waiting,” with the consequence that
fiduciary duties would apply to all actors within the category. The Chapter then examines the
duties owed by principals and agents following the termination of an agency relationship as well
as the more contestable stage that precedes termination. Implications for more general or
theoretical accounts of fiduciary law conclude.
II.

The formation and termination of agency relationships
Agency relationships are distinctive among fiduciary relationships, including those, like

agency, for which fiduciary character is ascribed by status or legal convention.2 Outside these
settled categories, courts impose fiduciary duties in particular relationships in response to
specific circumstances, in particular the potential for opportunism and abuse when one party

2On

status-based fiduciary relationships, see Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller,

Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 1, 2-3 (2014).
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invites and a vulnerable party reposes trust. 3 As Daniel Kelly observes, these cases usually fall
“along the borderline ... between an arms-length transaction, in which each party may act
according to its own self-interest, and a fiduciary relationship, in which the law requires a party
to act in the sole or best interests of another.” 4 A signal trait of agency law is the relative ease
and informality with which two parties may create an agency relationship and, later on, exit from
it. The common law defines agency as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act.”5 Creating a common-law agency relationship does not require
compliance with specified formalities, such as the execution of a written instrument, nor does it
require any filing with the state comparable to the requisites to form a corporation or other type
of limited-liability business entity. In this respect an agency relationship resembles a general
partnership, which is formed when parties agree to co-own a business for profit and requires no
compliance with specified formalities. The parties’ intention to formalize their relationship later
on, structuring it through a to-be-formed limited-liability entity, does not preclude the existence
of a general partnership.6

3See
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Agency law also enables principal and agent, as between themselves, to define the scope
of their relationship, including by specifying domains in which the agent may act free of
fiduciary duties to the principal. 7 More generally, the law recognizes that another type of legal
relationship—such as a debtor-creditor relationship—may co-exist with agency and confer rights
on the agent to act in ways contrary to the principal’s interests, as would a securities broker who
liquidates an over-margined account notwithstanding the client’s objections.8 The law also
recognizes relationships that resemble agency’s most basic consequence because one actor’s
conduct affects the legal position of another but the agent-like actor has an economic interest
distinct from the relationship that privileges actions taken solely to benefit that actor and that
supports contractual provisions controlling when and how the relationship may be terminated. 9
Corporate law acknowledges and defines roles for an important category of agents, corporate
officers.
Although agency is consensual, an enforceable contract between principal and agent need
not accompany or underlie its creation; many agency relationships are formed gratuitously.10
Thus, a relationship of common-law agency may link an agent to a principal prior to any an

7For

these possibilities, see Deborah A. DeMott, Defining Agency and Its Scope (II), in

COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW 396 (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg, eds., 2016).
8For

more on the defined scope of agency relationships, see id. at 403.

9RESTATEMENT
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enforceable contract. As a consequence, agency relationships can arise with fluidity and lack the
harder-edged moment of formation or initiation integral to conventional accounts of contract
formation.11 Some agents—corporate officers, for example—may commence acting in a de facto
capacity, in advance of compliance with formal requisites, including those imposed by a firm’s
governance documents.12 Many contemporary statutes enable agency-like relationships typified
by precisely-drawn triggers that initiate the relationship and the duties that follow, such as
durable powers of attorney.13
Simple to form, agency relationships are also terminable at will by either principal or
agent, albeit in breach of any contract between them. A principal has power to terminate the
agent’s actual authority to act on the principal’s behalf by making a manifestation of revocation
to the agent. Likewise, an agent has power, through a manifestation to the principal, to terminate

11For

a critique of hinging contractual obligations on “a specific hypothetical moment of

contract formation,” see Shawn J. Bayern, The Nature and Timing of Contract Formation, in
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their relationship by renouncing authority.14 More vividly, “you’re fired” and “I quit” operate as
performative utterances to end an agency relationship, even when a contract between the parties
provides otherwise.15
Why are common-law agency relationships so relatively fragile? And why does agency
law privilege one party’s present preferences over both parties’ inconsistent earlier preferences to
bind themselves to an ongoing relational commitment? The underlying premise of agency is
consent, in particular, the principal’s consent on an ongoing basis to legally-effectual
representation by the agent. By revoking an agent’s actual authority, the principal retrieves or
calls back an extension of the principal’s own legal personality. 16 Renouncing and thereby
terminating an agency relationship also frees the agent from most constraints imposed by the

14RESTATEMENT
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relationship, including the agent’s duty to comply with the principal’s lawful instructions and the
agent’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principal. Possessing a unilateral power to terminate
should lower a prospective agent’s anticipated costs of undertaking to act on behalf of any
particular principal, including an employer. Although the agent may be obliged to forego
attractive opportunities during the relationship, opportunities of the same type may rightfully
become available once the agent exits the relationship.17
Agency doctrine overall mixes immutable characteristics—including the agent’s
fiduciary duties to the principal and the unilateral powers held by principal and agent to
terminate the relationship—with those subject to agreement between agent and principal,
including agreements defining the scope of the agency relationship to privilege conduct by the
agent that would otherwise breach the agent’s duties to the principal, as discussed above. Thus,
subject to limits grounded in public policy concerns, an agent may agree not to compete with the
principal following termination. 18 An agreement may also contain provisions that price out the
cost to the agent of early termination by the principal, as in many executive employment
agreements. In other relationships, contract provisions—typically drafted by the agent—may
impose fees on the principal if the principal terminates the relationship within a set period.
Termination or exit fees charged by asset managers (“investment advisers” in the United States),
although fairly common, can be problematic.19 Assets under management in a client’s account

17RESTATEMENT
18Id.

(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10, cmt. b.

§ 8.04, cmt. b.

19Jason
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belong to the client as principal, not the manager, who holds the assets as an agent who is the
client’s fiduciary. Often clients exit a management relationship when they’re unhappy with the
manager, which implies that an exit fee can operate as a penalty geared to retain clients and can
function inconsistently with the adviser/manager’s fiduciary duty to place the clients’ interests
before its own as their agent.
Just as a prospective agent may owe duties to the principal prior to the formation of an
agency relationship or a contract encapsulating the parties’ agreement, terminating an agency
relationship does not end all duties the parties owe each other. Some linger post-termination,
echoing the operation of an agent’s “lingering authority” to bind the principal, that is, the
appearance of authority that may survive following the termination of actual authority.20
Additionally, when an agent contemplates terminating the relationship—perhaps in the prospect
of competing with the principal—the agent’s commitment to the principal and orientation toward
its interests may no longer be as whole-hearted as loyalty requires as assessed in retrospect by
the now-former principal. Even when the agent’s conduct does not contravene duties of loyalty,
investing effort and ingenuity to prepare for new adventures can sap the agent’s diligence on
behalf of the (present) principal. 21
Long-established doctrine permits an agent to take otherwise-lawful steps to prepare to

20RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.11 and cmt. c. “Lingering authority” requires

that the third party’s belief that the agent acts with authority be reasonable. Id.
21An

agent’s duties of performance require that the agent “act with the care, competence,
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-9-

compete once an agency relationship is terminated, 22 and to do so without disclosure to the
principal.23 When preparations to compete overlap with continued service, ambiguity can cloud
inquiries into the agent’s conduct and motives. For example, consider an agent/employee whose
duties require visible interactions with major customers of the principal/employer’s business.
When the agent is especially responsive and effective in customer-facing interactions, was the
agent motivated to solidify a relationship that will follow her to a competitor? Or simply to do
good work on behalf of the principal?24 As elaborated below, permissible (and secret)
preparations to compete imply that an agent’s duty of loyalty to the principal, or at least its scope
or intensity, may diminish when the agent contemplates ending the relationship. Of course, if an
agent abandons her plan and decides to stay, the duty of loyalty should resume its earlier

22Id.

§ 8.04; accord, RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.04, cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST.

23An

agent’s duties include “a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with

2015).

facts that the agent knows...when the facts are material to the agent’s duties to the principal ....”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11. This general duty does not encompass the fact that
the agent plans to compete with the principal. Id. § 8.04, cmt. c. Nor does the agent’s fiduciary
duty of loyalty require disclosure. Id.
24Id.
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principal’s customers or employees to join the competing enterprise, the fact that customers or
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F. Supp. 219, 234 (D.D.C. 1996).
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dimensions.
The prospect of fiduciary duties that precede the formation of an agency relationship, like
the duties that linger following termination and that may dim if not lessen preceding termination,
complicates schematic accounts of fiduciary relationships that position parties at arms length
prior to and following a relationship. A visual or mechanical metaphor may help conceptualize
these peripheral duties: the purchaser of a switch to control an electric light has a choice between
an on-off toggle function, or a dimmer control through a rheostat that enables a user to vary the
light’s degrees of brightness. Agency doctrine operates at times more like a dimmer switch than
an on-off toggle, in particular in the inception and expiration of fiduciary duties. This lack of
precise demarcation increases the need for fact-specific inquiries to resolve disputed situations, a
consequence not unique to agency law. 25 Bright-line determinations are not absent from cases
applying agency law, just not universal.
III.

Agents’ duties preceding agency relationships
Prospective principals and agents owe duties to each other derived from other bodies of

law, including tort law. In one line of cases, an employee of a brokerage firm defrauds investors
who are not—or at least not yet—clients of the firm, acting without either actual or apparent
authority to bind the firm and through transactions that explicitly are not conducted through the
firm. But the employee’s association with the firm enabled the employee to identify prospects to

25For

an example, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance on the Fringes of Marriage, 2018

UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 235, 276 (2018)(observing that “[t]he simple truth is that persons enter and
leave our lives at times distinct from crowning acts”).
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defraud, while a known association with the firm lent plausibility to the employee’s conduct. In
the brokerage context, it’s well established that an agency relationship begins only when a client
places an order and the broker agrees to execute it. 26 However, if the firm acted negligently in
hiring its employee—perhaps one with a prior history of client complaints or regulatory
infractions—or in supervising or retaining the employee, the firm could be subject to liability on
a tort theory. Accepting this theory, a recent case analogized the premise for the brokerage firm’s
liability to the liability of a burglar alarm company that hires, as a door-to-door salesman, a felon
known to be violent who kidnaps a prospective alarm-system customer.27 An employee’s fraud
also subjects the employee to liability to the prospective customer. The brokerage firm’s liability
is direct, not vicarious; the employee acted without actual or apparent authority on behalf of the
firm but the firm itself, if negligent, is subject to liability.28
Apart from law of general applicability, prospective agents are subject to duties to
prospective principals in particular domains. Relationships between lawyers and prospective
clients are instructive, given that lawyers are treated as their clients’ agents for many purposes. 29
Only to a client does a lawyer owe the full complement of duties that reflect the fiduciary

26Le

Marchant v. Moore, 44 N.E. 770 (N.Y. 1896); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative &

“ERISA” Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 799, 843 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
27Owens

v. Stifel Nicholaus & Co., 650 Fed. App’x 764 (11th Cir. 2016)(discussing

salience of Underberg v. Southern Alarm, Inc., 643 S.E. 2d 374, 375 (Ga. App. Ct. 2007).
28RESTATEMENT
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liability).
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Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (1998).
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character of a lawyer-client relationship.30 However, it would be mistaken to assume that a
lawyer owes a prospective client no legal duties other than those derived from tort law. Lawyers
owe prospective clients a duty not to use or disclose confidential information learned through
consultation with the prospective client, subject to exceptions not germane to this Chapter. In
possession of a prospective client’s confidential information, a lawyer is subject to constraints in
representing clients whose interests are materially adverse to the prospective client’s.31 Likewise,
a lawyer owes duties to a prospective client concerning property in the lawyer’s custody. 32 To
the extent the lawyer furnishes legal services, the lawyer owes the prospective client a duty of
reasonable care.33 Contracts in which clients or prospective clients express advance consent to
conflicts—with the lawyer’s own interests or representation of other clients—that may later
emerge in the relationship are effective only when the client is fully informed and the lawyer
reasonably believes no client’s interest will be adversely affected. 34

30RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (3) and cmt. b (AM.

LAW INST. 2000) (stating that “[a] lawyer is a fiduciary ....”).
31

Id. § 15(1)(a) & (2).

32Id.

§ 15(1)(b).

33Id.

§ 15(1)(c).

34MODEL

RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). On the efficacy of

general open-ended waivers, compare Galdene Labs., L.P. v. Activis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 F. Supp.
2d 390 (N.D. Tex. 2013)(denying motion to disqualify counsel subject to unrelated conflict
pertaining to current client; client gave informed consent to open-ended general waiver that
would ordinarily be ineffective, but acted through general counsel who frequently retained
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The same suite of duties applies even when no lawyer-client relationship eventuates. And
why? Sharing confidential information is a frequent linchpin in seeking legal services, situating
prospective clients much like clients. The vulnerability that follows for clients, once confidential
information has been shared, seems essential to a relationship with a lawyer, even when the
relationship is tentative or prospective or the client is sophisticated. And when a lawyer gives
advice or otherwise furnishes legal services to a prospective client, the recipient is likely to rely,
perhaps by failing to form a lawyer-client relationship either with the advice-giver or another
lawyer.
As their clients’ agents, lawyers are distinctive. They are officers of the court and
members of a largely self-regulated profession as well as agents whose representative role comes
packaged with other significant functions, most importantly furnishing advice to clients on a
confidential basis. Their distinct duties—including those owed to prospective clients regardless
of whether a lawyer-client relationship is formed—stem from the lawyer’s status as a lawyer.
Revisited in this light, brokers—the agents with which this section began—are disanalogous in
significant ways. Any duty a broker owes a customer concerning investment advice is distinct

outside counsel, including large law firms) with Celgene Corp. v. KV Pharma. Co., 2008 WL
2937415 *8 (D.N.J. 2008)(granting motion to disqualify when retention agreement included
comparable waiver language; agreement did not manifest informed consent because it did not
specify types of conflicts, such as concurrent representation of generic pharmaceutical
companies in patent cases). Galdene and Celgene both shift the burden—ordinarily borne by the
party moving to disqualify counsel—to the law firm resisting disqualification.
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from the agency duties the broker owes in executing an order from the customer to buy or sell. 35
In contrast, the structure of a lawyer-client relationship, including one in formation, situates the
client or prospective client in a position that entails sharing confidential information with the
vulnerabilities that follow. Nonetheless, might a broker ever duties as a sort of “agent-inwaiting” before receiving an order for execution?
IV.

The status of “agent-in-waiting”?
The imposition of duties (whether or not deemed fiduciary in character) that anticipate

the formation of an agency relationship could be conceptualized in several ways, each with its
distinct rationale. First, pre-agency duties may be grounded in the application of other bodies of
law. These include tort law, which furnishes the basis for brokerage-firm liability to prospective
clients in the “bad broker” cases discussed above. Second, pre-agency fiduciary duty may be
grounded in a fact-specific, case-by-case determination of whether a particular relationship was
characterized by trust invited by one party and justifiably reposed by the other. Lawyers’ duties
to prospective clients, discussed above, operate categorically but the underlying justifications
resemble those for the imposition of fact-specific fiduciary duties. Third, pre-agency fiduciary
duties could follow from treating a relationship as an instance of a category in which all
relationships are fiduciary ones, perhaps termed “agency-in-waiting.”36 Grounding pre-agency
duties in a distinct state that anticipates the formation of an agency relationship calls into
question whether the duties arise when no agency relationship ensues. Perhaps only a limited
suite of duties follows; recall that a lawyer owes duties to a prospective client but not the

35In

re Enron, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 843.

36Thanks

to Richard Brooks for urging me to develop the implications.
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broader-reaching fiduciary duties owed to a client. Statutes and regulatory provisions may also
be relevant to shape or dominate analysis and resolution. The sections that follow explore preagency duties for two significant groups: de facto and de jure corporate officers, and brokers.
A.

Corporate officers, de facto and de jure

An actor who assumes to act as an agent in a formally defined category when requisite
formalities have not been met—typified by a de facto corporate officer—owes fiduciary duties in
the de facto phase, which may or may not precede a de jure phase. This is because the actor in
question has assumed to act as an agent, in de facto officer cases with some appearance of
rightful occupancy of the office, such as acquiescence by the corporation’s board of directors.
Thus, the status of de facto officer isn’t an instance of acting as a poseur—purporting to be an
agent when that’s not true at the time of holding out—or a fiduciary de son tort—unilaterally
taking on a fiduciary status (or its appearance) without a regular appointment to it. 37 By
definition, de facto officers do not act unilaterally in assuming a particular office. The
consequences for the corporation are closely linked to apparent authority because it’s requisite
that a de facto officer, in exercising the functions of an office, reasonably appear to hold the
office.38 To exercise the functions of an office in interactions with third parties as a corporation’s

37On

poseurs, see Deborah A. DeMott, The Poseur as Agent, in AGENCY LAW IN

COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 35-54 (Danny Busch et al. eds., 2016). On fiduciaries de son tort, see
Andrew S. Gold, The State as a Wrongful Fiduciary, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 183, 190-93
(Evan J. Criddle et al. eds. 2018).
38See

Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 649, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)(individual

found to have acted as an officer signed corporations’ income tax returns as corporate president
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representative is to act as the corporation’s agent. Like formal appointment or election to an
office, whether an agent exercises an office’s functions is readily determinable.
Returning to the potential status of “agent-in-waiting,” consider the position of an
individual whose announced appointment as a corporate officer will become effective as a future
time, who, in the meantime, prepares to undertake the office’s responsibilities. In In re the Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the court held that the corporation’s new President did not owe
fiduciary duties before assuming office, including duties concerning the terms of his employment
agreement.39 Not having purported to assume the duties of the presidency before his announced
start date, the officer-in-waiting was not a de facto officer; his activities to prepare himself for
the office did not amount to exercising its functions. 40 Additionally, the facts fall short of the
bases on which courts impose fact-specific fiduciary duties. More generally, whether an actor
has entered the realm of corporate officeholders and their fiduciary duties—even as a de facto
officer—is relatively amenable to a bright-line or toggle-switch determination.41

and assistant treasurer, had input into corporations’ formation and operation, and took over their
management). On de facto officers in general, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03,
cmt. e.
39906

A.2d 27, 48-49 (Del. 2006). I testified as an expert witness on other issues in this

litigation.
40Id.

at 41 n. 14. Both determinations were made on the basis of a summary judgment

record. See In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2004 WL 2050138 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10,
2004).
41Along

these lines, the trial court observed, “[a] bright line rule whereby officers and
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B.

Brokers

In contrast with corporate officeholders, the facts of the leading brokerage case, Martin v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc.,42 illustrate situations in which multiple bases for pre-agency
fiduciary duties may be present. In Martin, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a commodities
broker had a duty to explain the nature of its opaque fee and commission structures to
prospective clients. The court stressed that “where the very creation of the agency relationship
involves a special trust and confidence on the part of the principal in the subsequent fair dealing
of the agent, the prospective agent may be under a fiduciary duty to disclose the terms of his
employment as an agent.”43 It’s not clear whether the imposition of the duty of disclosure applies
at a categorical level and thus becomes applicable when the parties intend to create a relationship
of a particular type, or whether the duty applies (and the prospective agent’s failure to make the
requisite clarifying disclosure breaches the duty) only following a case-specific inquiry into the
qualities of the relationship between a particular broker and its prospective principal. If the latter,
a sophisticated or experienced investor could confront a higher barrier in establishing that the

directors become fiduciaries only when they are officially installed, and receive the formal
investiture of authority that accompanies such office or directorship, is a more reasonable and
desirable rule” than imposing fiduciary duties at an earlier point, which could prove
indeterminate in practice. 2004 WL 2050138 at * 4. Likewise, a corporation’s directors and
controlling shareholder are not as such agents of the corporation. See Lyman Johnson, this
volume (conference draft p. 8, sentence beginning section B).
42643
43Id.

N.E.2d 734 (Ill. 1995).

at 740.

-18-

broker owed a duty, on the assumption that such an investor, acting skeptically and at arms
length, would inquire about fee and commission structures. Regardless of an investor’s degree of
sophistication, the broker possesses an informational advantage, here concerning the terms and
operation of its fee and commission structure; a sophisticated investor might be expected to
realize this fact, ask questions, and consider going elsewhere for brokerage services if unsatisfied
by the broker’s answers.
Like securities brokers, commodities brokers are agents who operate in a context shaped
by regulation, which does not explicitly or comprehensively resolve all questions that may arise.
General agency law could be salient to a practice of some brokers, anticipatory front-running.
Regulation requires that commodities brokerage firms adopt internal prohibitions against frontrunning by individual brokers, that is, practices that prioritize trades in proprietary accounts or
accounts in which a broker has an interest, ahead of executable customer orders in the same
commodity. By front-running a customer’s order an agent competes with the principal (the
customer), contravening the agent’s fiduciary duty of loyalty unless the customer consents.44
Front-running can also injure the principal when a broker’s front-running transaction is large
enough to move the market price. If the broker profits through the front-running strategy, the
broker also nets more from the transaction than the commission to which the customer agreed. In
any event, by accepting or undertaking to execute an order to buy or sell on behalf of a customer,
the broker has consented to and formed an agency relationship with the customer and thus owes
fiduciary duties to the customer as its principal.
In contrast, anticipatory front-running could be prompted by a prospective customer’s
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request for a quote from a commodities broker, not an executable order. Informational
asymmetries are present in the relationship because the broker has access to real-time
information about the relevant market that the customer lacks, including information about order
flow. Commodities regulation itself imposes no explicit prohibition on “trading ahead” of
prospective customer orders, as opposed to orders that are “executable.” However, commodities
regulation in the United States now includes a prohibition on insider trading—narrower than the
counterpart applicable to insider trading in securities—that proscribes the use of misappropriated
information in breach of a pre-existing duty.45 The reasoning in Martin could ground liability in
a pre-existing duty, either because the circumstances surrounding a particular request for a quote
led the customer to repose trust and confidence in the broker, or because circumstances or
structures generally in commodities markets necessitate that prospective customers repose trust
and confidence in brokers.
To be sure, anticipatory front-running is riskier for a broker than conventional forms of
front-running because if the request for a quote is not followed by an order the broker may hold
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an illiquid position. This reduces the likelihood that the broker will profit through front-running
as well as the likelihood of injury, here to a prospective customer who may never place an order
to be executed. If so, grounding “agent-in-waiting” liability in the prospective principal’s
vulnerability to injury, does not seem compelling in this scenario, nor does a commodities broker
as such, unlike a lawyer, occupy a status that engenders fiduciary obligations to prospective
clients. In contrast, consider the vulnerabilities created by agreeing to co-own a business—which
creates a general partnership, as discussed above—and the likelihood that the partners will share
share ideas well before they create a formal (and limited-liability) business firm. Sharing at “the
dawn of the relationship,” in Christine Hurt’s terminology, is both crucial to future viability and
a source of vulnerability for the partners, who risk betrayal by each other. Within this “danger
zone,” the law categorically assigns the relationship among business co-owners to general
partnership and its imposition of fiduciary duties. 46
C.

Implications of ubiquity of agency relationships

As one court recently noted, agency relationships are characterized by “mundane
ubiquity,”47 given their presence in a range of recurrent situations. Although agency relationships
are governed by general doctrines—including those defining an agent’s fiduciary duties—it’s
unsurprising that at their temporal edges the duties imposed on agents-in-waiting are not
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uniform. Creating a lawyer-client relationship in itself likely creates vulnerabilities for the
prospective client, given the need to share confidential information with the lawyer to form the
relationship coupled with the likelihood that the prospective client will rely on any advice the
lawyer gives. Thus, as a categorical matter lawyers owe duties to prospective clients, including
constraints in the representation of other clients with materially adverse interests. Brokers, in
contrast, are not categorically subject to fiduciary (or fiduciary-like) duties to prospective
customers; and it’s not evident why imposing such duties would be when a prospective customer
never places an order. As Martin illustrates, a court may be persuaded that the specifics of a
relationship broker’s relationship to a customer warrant the imposition of fiduciary duties (in that
case, a duty of disclosure), based either on the nature of the relationship and the vulnerability it
creates for the client, or on informational advantages possessed by the broker and used to
disadvantage the client. Separately, for some recurrent situations, articulating a bright-line rule is
preferable to case-by-case inquiry into factual specifics. Thus, lawyers owe duties to prospective
clients as a categorical matter; corporate officers-in-waiting are not subject to fiduciary duties
unless or until they purport to perform the functions of the office. Up to then, the potential for
abuse and opportunism by all officers-in-waiting isn’t compelling enough to offset the benefits
of a clear line of demarcation. 48
V.

Duties on the periphery of termination
Terminating an agency relationship does not end all duties that agent and principal owe to

each other, most obviously duties imposed by an enforceable contract between them.
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Additionally, both principal and agent hold unilateral power to terminate the relationship. The
fact that either or both contemplate ending the relationship does not eliminate their duties,
although the agent’s continuing duty of loyalty to the principal co-exists—if awkwardly—with
any undisclosed plan to depart and preparations toward that end. Consider first ongoing duties
that survive termination, then duties owed when either agent or principal, or both, contemplate
exit.
A.

Duties following termination

Distinct from duties imposed by contract, an agent’s duty not to use or disclose the nowformer principal’s confidential information for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party
survives termination of the agency relationship,49 as does the agent’s duty not to retain or use the
principal’s property without the principal’s consent. 50 It is irrelevant whether the agent has
memorized the information or retained a physical record of it.51 Whether a former agent’s
disclosure of confidential information breaches the agent’s duty to the principal depends on the
agent’s motivation or purpose in making disclosure. In Dirks v. S.E.C., in which a former
corporate officer told an investment analyst that the corporation was rife with fraud, the
revelation did not breach the former officer’s fiduciary duties. He sought to expose fraud, not to
realize a monetary benefit or confer a gift on the analyst.52
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Following the termination of an agency relationship, the now-former agent owes the
principal a duty to cease acting as an agent or purporting to do so,53 even when the principal’s
termination of the agent’s authority is in breach of contract. Agents who do not follow what
could be termed the principal’s countermanding or final instruction act wrongfully toward the
principal by persisting. But within agency’s taxonomy of duties, the agent’s refusal to comply—
for example, by remaining in possession of property the agent manages on the principal’s
behalf—breaches not a fiduciary duty but a duty of performance. 54 This distinction carries
implications for remedies against the now-former agent who, of course, is no longer an agent
subject to the full suite of an agent’s duties. In particular, an agent’s breach of a duty of loyalty is
a basis on which the principal may seek forfeiture of commissions or other compensation paid or
payable to the agent during the period of disloyalty, for which the duration may be disputed.55
Characterized as disobedience to an instruction from the principal, the agent’s persistence would
not be disloyal conduct that forfeits the agent’s right to compensation for prior service. 56 Likely
more significant to most former principals, a now-former agent lacks apparent authority to bind
the principal to a third party who knows or has good reason to know that the agency relationship
has ended.57
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Post-termination, a principal’s duties to a former agent—beyond those created by
contract—are fewer in number, just as they are throughout the relationship. This seeming
imbalance reflects a basic consequence of agency itself: the relationship situates the agent (and
only the agent) in a representative position to take action with legal consequences for the
principal, and often in proximity to the principal’s property. 58 Nonetheless, a principal may
engage in conduct that, although not conventionally tortious, will foreseeably inflict loss on a
now-former agent. In Shen v. Leo A. Daly Co., the principal terminated the agent it had engaged
as its general manager for Taiwan, which requires that the principal officially designate a
“responsible person” to conduct business and affix that agent’s signature-equivalent to tax
returns.59 Following the termination, the principal did not remove its designation of its nowformer agent as its responsible person despite warnings from the agent that the failure might
subject the agent to adverse legal consequences in the event of tax disputes between Taiwan and
the principal. Following a final adverse tax determination, the principal refused to pay the
amount claimed, prompting Taiwanese authorities to notify the former agent that he was
forbidden to leave the country pending resolution of the country’s tax dispute with the principal.
The court held that the principal was subject to liability for loss suffered by its former agent,
including attorneys’ fees he incurred. Rejecting the former agent’s argument that the principal’s
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conduct constituted false imprisonment, 60 the court held that the principal breached the duty of
good faith and fair dealing it owed its former agent, which, in the court’s analysis, was tortious.
Necessarily co-existing with the principal’s ongoing power to terminate the
relationship,61 the scope of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is crimped as a consequence.
Whether the duty is embraced and how it is formulated vary across jurisdictions. Framing the
inquiry within contract law, a recent Australian case declined to imply a duty of mutual trust and
confidence that would be breached when an employer undercut a soon-to-be-former employee’s
ability to utilize helpful mechanisms created by the employer. In Commonwealth Bank v. Barker,
the bank decided to make the employee’s position redundant and to terminate his employment in
about four weeks. The bank also held out hope that the employee could be redeployed within its
organization.62 His manager sent the employee an email urging him to work with a careersupport officer, who also emailed the employee, both using the employee’s bank email address.
However, the employee’s access to his bank email account was terminated at the time of the
redundancy notice; he alleged that, as a consequence, he did not become aware of a position
description that may have fitted him. The court rejected the implication of a term of mutual trust
and confidence, instead characterizing employment as a domain dominated by legislation. The
court explicitly declined to follow authority from the United Kingdom, which held that former
(and innocent) employees of a scandal-ridden bank stated legally viable claims in the bank’s
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winding-up proceeding. The U.K. court held that the bank owed its employees an implied duty of
trust and confidence that would be breached by mismanagement that leaves employees
unemployable elsewhere due to the stigma created by their former employer. 63
B.

Preparing for termination

Agents and principals who plan to end an agency relationship do not owe each other a
duty to disclose that fact, potentially giving each the advantage of an informational asymmetry in
continued dealings with the other. Although (subject to exceptions not relevant here) an agent
owes the principal a duty to disclose facts that are material to the agent’s duties to the principal, 64
the duty does not require advance warning that the agent will renounce authority. Additionally, if
the parties negotiate over the terms of their relationship—to continue it with modifications or
terminate on mutually-agreed terms65—the principal and the agent likely negotiate to further
their own interests as each then understands them.
This reality requires some tempering of the content or scope of the agent’s overarching
duty of loyalty to the principal, which is “to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters
connected with the agency relationship.”66 By participating in the negotiations, the principal has
not consented to the agent’s self-interested stance because the principal does not know all
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material facts, which include the agent’s undisclosed objectives and negotiating strategy. 67 More
plausibly, the agent’s conduct in renegotiating the relationship’s terms falls outside its scope, as
would the agent’s knowledge of the fact that the agent plans to renounce authority and thereby
end the relationship. To be sure, the agent’s actions in negotiating are “connected with” the
agency relationship in a causal or factual sense because the relationship still exists, but the
agent’s actions are insufficiently within its scope to justify requiring that the agent renegotiate
solely for the principal’s benefit. The principal, knowing the identity of the party with whom it’s
negotiating, would not reasonably expect the agent to bargain toward achieving the principal’s
benefit, as opposed to the agent’s own objectives. And just as the principal holds unilateral
power to terminate the relationship, so does the agent. Accordingly, a principal may try to
structure incentives to keep key agents on board and motivate them, especially once they
become aware that the relationship will end. 68
Likewise, an agent may make preparations to compete with the principal once the agency
relationship ends. Agency law defines “preparations” to exclude conduct—albeit preparatory to
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competition—too proximately situated to the principal’s business operations and assets,
including soliciting existing customers or employees of the principal to follow the agent.69 Such
conduct is analogous to an agent’s extraction of the principal’s property or confidential
information for subsequent competitive use, which would breach the agent’s fiduciary duties. 70
Beyond instances of active solicitation, an agent—especially one positioned within a principal’s
organization—may be better situated to design a competitive plan than are potential third-party
competitors, who may lack established ties to the principal’s suppliers or customers, as well as
ties to the principal’s personnel. Agents may also be able to time their departures to inflict
maximum competitive damage on the principal. In extreme cases—such as calculated en masse
departures at a sensitive time for the principal—courts may determine that the agents’ conduct
went beyond mere “planning” to compete to the commencement of a competitive business while
still engaged by the principal. 71
The general rule permitting preparations to compete does not formally differentiate
among employee-agents, whose roles range from providing non-managerial services to broad
responsibilities as an entity’s executive officers. It’s hard to generalize from reported cases
across jurisdictions. For example, one court categorically treated preparations to compete by
corporate officers as breaches of fiduciary duty. 72 Some courts impose a heightened duty on
officers, in particular a duty not to act in ways that impede the firm’s ability to continue in
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business.73 Officers who agree with each other to compete post-termination may thereby breach
their fiduciary duties, especially when their agreement is colored by extreme or egregious
conduct.74 A fair generalization about many cases is that “actions of corporate executives are
likely to receive particular scrutiny.”75 And sometimes-subtle interactions between motive and
conduct can situate post-termination disputes over pre-departure preparations beyond bright-line
determinations, into the realm of fact-intensive inquiry.
As this Chapter illustrates, agents are heterogenous in the specifics of the duties they
owe, including those connected to termination. Recall the discussion above of a lawyer’s duties
in dealing with a prospective client. Although a lawyer may terminate the representation of a
client, the lawyer’s owes the client a duty to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to
protect the client’s interests, including giving notice to the client of the termination or impending
termination.76 In contrast, agency law does not impose a general duty on either principals or
agents to act in a harm-minimizing fashion, as opposed to the more minimal duties surveyed in
this essay; the court’s justification for imposing liability on the principal in Shen is ingenious and
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unusual. And exiting from an agency relationship frees the agent to compete with the principal
and take other actions adverse to the principal’s interests. Lawyers, in contrast, owe duties to
former clients that constrain their rights to undertake the representation of parties with materially
adverse interests in the same or a related matter. 77 General agency law—the realm of corporate
officers and brokers—defines duties and the conduct that breaches them in terms that
accommodate a broader range of actors and activities than would be tolerable in the realm of
lawyers’ roles and duties.
VI. Theoretical implications
These dimensions of agency doctrine have implications for scholarly accounts of
fiduciary law more generally. When the assumed prototype for the general category of actors
subject to fiduciary duties is a trustee and the prototypical fiduciary institution is a trust, 78 agents
and agency relationships can appear to be discordant, non-conforming, or marginal instances. It’s
essential to an agency relationship that the principal have the right or power of control over the
agent—and thus the power to furnish binding instructions on an interim basis—while the extent
of a principal’s control and how it is exercised can vary widely. An actor who is not subject to
control of any sort exercised by a principal is not an agent, with the consequence that the parties’
relationship is not one of common-law agency.79 But the irreducible requisite of control for
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agency relationships mean they lack an essential property of fiduciary relationships specified by
leading theories: possession by an actor of discretionary powers, or the exercise of discretionary
power over a critical resource of the beneficiary. 80 To be sure, an agent has power to disregard
the principal’s instructions, but agency law does not entitle an agent to treat the bounds of actual
authority, including the principal’s interim instructions, as mere suggestions or precatory
expressions that are not binding.
As this Chapter demonstrates, fiduciary duties within agency doctrine reflect signal
characteristics of agency relationships not present in relationships governed by trust-law
doctrine. A trustee’s duties are tied to the trustee’s exercise or non-exercise of powers as a
trustee81 and decisions about whether and how to exercise those powers, 82 which circumscribes
their scope and duration, unlike the more fluid duties owed by agents, including former and
prospective ones. The scope of a trustee’s duty of loyalty focuses on the administration of the
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trust,83 in contrast to the broader or less specified range of an agent’s duty. Additionally, agency
doctrine applies to ongoing relationships between two parties whose perspectives and
preferences may shift over time. Thus it accommodates relationships in which parties may
bargain with each other on an interim basis to adjust the terms of their relationship going
forward, each always holding a unilateral power to exit. Relatedly, agency doctrine also
accommodates the possibility that agents while still employed may take measures to prepare to
compete with the principal. This is not the structure that underlies a prototypical donative trust,
which is created by a manifestation of a settlor as a fiduciary relationship through which the
trustee holds title to property and is subject to duties to deal with the property for the benefit of
others.84
The duties that prospective agents may owe to principals also cast new light on a longestablished dimension of contract law, which “accords parties the freedom to negotiate without
risk of precontractual liability.”85 The duty of fair dealing that’s generally imposed on parties to
an existing contract does not reach precontractual negotiations.86 Despite cases and secondary
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authority recognizing a theory of liability grounded in one party’s reasonable reliance
engendered by negotiations toward a contract that is never concluded, only rarely do litigants in
the United States seek relief on this basis. Parties engaged in negotiations toward a contract may
be unaware that justifiable reliance can support liability; or perhaps, as Allan Farnworth
suggests, parties are generally content with “the common law’s aleatory view of negotiations,”
which might also reflect broader social disinterest in the outcome of negotiations. 87 Against this
contract-law backdrop, the prospect that agents may owe duties beyond those imposed by tort
law to prospective principals, or be subject to affirmative duties of disclosure in dealings with
prospective principals, can appear discordant. 88
However, both the Martin brokerage precedent and the duties that lawyers owe to
prospective clients—instances discussed at length above—could be distinguished from
negotiations toward a paradigmatic bilateral contract. First, consider the structures that particular
relationships necessitate. Dealings undertaken in anticipation of an agency relationship often
(and maybe even prototypically) involve informational asymmetries that reflect more than
disparities in expertise. In Martin, as in the hypothetical instance of anticipatory front-running,
the broker had access to material information that was legally unavailable to its prospective
principal. Agents—like lawyers—whose functions require knowledge of their clients’ or
principals’ confidential information typically deal with a party, a prospective client, who is made
vulnerable by sharing information necessary to proceed toward an agency relationship.
Separately, consider the nature of the prospective agent’s activity. The scope of pre-agency
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duties could place them outside “negotiations” as a category of activity; the disclosure of fee and
commission structures that Martin may require could precede negotiations, a distinct phase of
activity. Additionally, by front-running on the basis of a client’s order or request for a quote, a
broker is not negotiating with a client or prospective client, just exploiting an informational
advantage. Finally, and much more broadly, negotiations toward an agency relationship could be
treated as a basis for the imposition of fiduciary duties full stop (or categorically), but such
breadth is inconsistent with much decisional law as well as with more tailored rationales that
ground pre-agency duties in structures that entail vulnerability or induce reliance.
Duties owed at the temporal edges of agency relationships also have implications for
general accounts of fiduciary duties, even apart from those premised on assuming a trust to be
the prototype of a fiduciary relationship. Some accounts of the fiduciary duty of loyalty
emphasize a cognitive dimension, that is, a focus on how the fiduciary deliberates and the
connection between such deliberation and the fiduciary’s actions. In recent scholarship, Stephen
Galoob and Ethan Leib demonstrate that a fiduciary’s cognition can bear on whether the
fiduciary has satisfied duties of loyalty imposed by the law, 89 building on their earlier work
identifying loyalty, deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness as the cognitive dimensions
of loyalty.90 A cognitive account of fiduciary loyalty provides a different framework for
resolving issues when an agent prepares to compete with the principal before the agency
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relationship has come to an end, or even engages in a calculated assessment of whether to quit.
For Galoob and Leib, the fiduciary duty of loyalty requires robust commitment; preparing to
compete could betray the principal, or attempt betrayal, as a consequence of the agent’s
abandoned or weakened commitment to the principal.91 To the extent agency law tolerates
preparations to compete, and pre-preparation stragegizing over exit, there’s a limit to the fit
between cognitivist accounts and the law.
Additionally, to encompass duties on the peripheries of agency relationships within a
cognitivist account would require deepening the cognitivist account. If an agent plans (or hopes)
to exit from the relationship and does not disclose that fact to the principal, is the non-disclosure
an instance of disloyalty that makes forfeiture of compensation due the agent an available
remedy to the principal? Alternatively, the structure of agency itself—a fiduciary relationship
that empowers both parties to act unilaterally to end the relationship—may mean that conduct
will often reflect a mix of motivations and that the retrospective lens of litigation will often
require factually intensive scrutiny.
VII. Conclusion
Agency relationships, so quotidian, can elude theoretical frameworks premised on other
types of legal relationships. The reasons why prospective agents might owe fiduciary duties to
principals, and the status of those duties when an agent plans to terminate an agency relationship,
have broader implications for accounts of fiduciary obligation within business firms.
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